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ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION: HOW FAR CAN IT GO? 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, 
SECOND DEPARTMENT 
Chiara v. Town of New Castle1 
(Decided January 14, 2015) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2015, the New York State Appellate Division, 
Second Department, held in Chiara v. Town of New Castle that a per-
son may claim membership in a protected class for an employment 
discrimination claim based upon his spouse’s religion under the New 
York State Human Rights Law.2  In other words, according to the 
Second Department, religion-based associational discrimination is ac-
tionable in the State of New York.3  However, it is unclear how the 
court came to this conclusion because the court relied only on two 
federal cases that upheld race-based Title VII associational discrimi-
nation4 and did not bridge the gap between race-based and religion-
based claims or explain whether such claims have the same analysis.  
The question remains whether there are different legal standards for 
different types of associational discrimination. 
II. CHIARA FACTS 
Petitioner Jeffrey Chiara worked as a highway laborer and 
later as a machine equipment operator for the Town of New Castle 
(the “Town”) for fifteen years.5  Though not Jewish himself, Chiara 
experienced anti-Semitic harassment throughout his employment be-
cause his coworkers knew that he was married to a Jewish woman.6  
 
1 2 N.Y.S.3d 132 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015). 
2 Id. at 141. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 140. 
5 Id. at 134-35. 
6 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 134-35. 
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One of his coworkers, Michael Molnar, repeatedly made highly of-
fensive, discriminatory remarks to Chiara, even though Chiara com-
plained to his supervisors and asked Molnar to stop.7  After one par-
ticularly vehement confrontation in May 2002, which resulted in 
Molnar being reprimanded and given separate work assignments, 
Chiara claimed that his supervisors and coworkers continued to har-
ass him until Chiara was terminated in 2007.8  He was called a “Jew 
lover” and overheard offensive comments such as, “Oh, that Jew will 
never get a job here” and references to yeshivas as “Jew farms.”9 
III. CHIARA PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In January 2005, Chiara commenced an action in the trial 
court for employment discrimination and hostile work environment10 
under New York State law11 against the Town, Michael Molnar, and 
the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works.12  Chiara 
amended his complaint in July 2006 to add the Town Administrator 
as a defendant and to include additional allegations.13  While this ac-
tion was ongoing in the trial court, the Town filed disciplinary charg-
es against Chiara for seven instances of misconduct and insubordina-
tion in the workplace.14  These charges included, among others, the 
use of inappropriate language toward a supervisor, an unexcused ab-
sence at a departmental meeting, and the use of work time for per-
sonal business.15  After an administrative hearing in September 2006, 
he was found guilty of five out of the seven charges of misconduct 
and was terminated on March 28, 2007 as a result of these findings.16  
Chiara was the only Town employee who received a notice of disci-
plinary charges pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 75, despite the 
 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 135-38. 
9 Id. at 137. 
10 Id. at 135.  The trial court dismissed Chiara’s cause of action for hostile work environ-
ment and the Second Department affirmed. Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 144.  As the focus of this 
case note is associational discrimination, the cause of action for hostile work environment is 
not relevant to my analysis and will not be discussed any further. 
11 It is unclear to the author why Chiara did not also bring a federal Title VII claim. See 
infra Part V.A. 
12 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 135. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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fact that other employees had allegedly acted inappropriately and un-
lawfully during the same time period.17  He contended that the disci-
plinary charges were brought against him in retaliation for the dis-
crimination claim that he brought against the Town, Michael Molnar, 
the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works, and the Town 
Administrator (hereinafter “Defendants”) in the trial court18 and not-
ed that the supervisors who had made the anti-Semitic remarks 
throughout his employment were the same supervisors who testified 
against him at the hearing that resulted in his termination.19 
In October 2011, Defendants moved for summary judgment 
in the trial court on the ground that Chiara could not establish a prima 
facie case for employment discrimination.20  Specifically, Defendants 
argued that Chiara was not a member of a protected class and was 
terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.21  In opposi-
tion, Chiara contended that he was a member of a protected class due 
to his marriage to a Jewish woman and that Defendants also violated 
his constitutional right to intimate association.22  Additionally, Chiara 
argued that there was ample evidence to show that his termination 
was based, at least in part, on discrimination.23  Nonetheless, the trial 
court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and specifi-
cally held that “[t]he contention by plaintiff, that he was . . . discrimi-
nated against by the Town, based on his wife’s religion, is nothing 
more than conjecture.”24 
Chiara appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment,25 which considered whether a claim of discrimination based 
upon the religion of a spouse (religion-based associational discrimi-
nation) is allowable under the New York State Human Rights Law.26  
This was a case of first impression for the Second Department.27  
Though federal courts have allowed claims for associational discrim-
 
17 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 138. 
18 Id. at 136. 
19 Id. at 142. 
20 Id. at 136. 
21 Id. 
22 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 137. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 138. 
25 Id. at 139. 
26 Id. at 134. 
27 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 134. 
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ination based on race,28 the extension of associational discrimination 
claims to religion had not yet been determined in New York until 
Chiara.29 
IV. SECOND DEPARTMENT’S DISCUSSION IN CHIARA 
Since there is a lack of authority under the New York State 
Human Rights Law to support a claim of discrimination based upon a 
spouse’s religion, the Second Department in Chiara first considered 
federal cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (herein-
after “Title VII”),30 which prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.”31  In that regard, the Second Department analyzed an 
Eleventh Circuit case, Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co.,32 
and a Second Circuit case, Holcomb v. Iona College,33 both of which 
held that an employee who experiences adverse action in the work-
place due to his employer’s disapproval of his interracial marriage 
has a cognizable claim for employment discrimination under Title 
VII.34  Though the plaintiffs in both cases were white, they nonethe-
less experienced discrimination based on their associations with Afri-
can American women and thus had claims based on associational dis-
crimination.35  In Chiara, the Second Department found that Chiara 
was a member of the protected class by virtue of his association with 
his Jewish wife.36  Thus, he had standing to sue for religious discrim-
ination, even though the discrimination was not directed at his reli-
gion but rather his wife’s religion.37  In addition to associational dis-
crimination, the court briefly noted that Chiara’s supervisors 
infringed upon Chiara’s First Amendment right to intimate associa-
 
28 See generally Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986). 
29 Thomas K. Johnson II & Betina Miranda, The Company You Keep: Associational Dis-
crimination, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/c1e130ed-
a040-407b-b70c-066a51644516/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/45e98e2c-feab-47cb-
b44d-0cd6e2a1290c/The%20Company%20You%20Keep-
%20Associational%20Discrimination.pdf. 
30 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
32 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986). 
33 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
34 Id. at 131-32; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. 
35 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 131-32; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. 
36 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 141. 
37 Id. at 140-41. 
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tion.38 
The Second Department further held that Chiara “raised a tri-
able issue of fact” as to whether his termination was motivated, at 
least in part, by discrimination when he presented evidence at trial 
that some of his supervisors, with the knowledge that his wife was 
Jewish, made “anti-Semitic remarks in his presence” and then testi-
fied against him in the disciplinary hearing that led to his termina-
tion.39  Since the court found that Chiara was indeed “a member of a 
protected class by virtue of his marriage to” his Jewish wife,40 the 
Second Department held that the trial court erred in granting defend-
ants’ summary judgment motion and that the factfinder should have 
decided whether the disciplinary charges and termination were moti-
vated by discrimination based on his protected status.41 
V. ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
Although the court in Chiara held that religion-based associa-
tional discrimination is actionable under the New York State Human 
Rights Law,42 it did not provide an adequate explanation for this 
holding.  In its decision, the Second Department focused on two fed-
eral Title VII cases because of the dearth of New York case law ad-
dressing associational discrimination,43 and because the standards for 
recovery under state law are similar to the federal standards.44  These 
two federal cases upheld only race-based associational discrimina-
tion and did not address whether the rationale behind such claims ap-
plies analogously to other associational discrimination claims, such 
as those based on religion, sex, or national origin.45  For example, the 
court in Parr held that “[w]here a plaintiff claims discrimination 
 
38 Id. at 141. 
39 Id. at 142. 
40 Id. at 137; 141. 
41 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 143. 
42 Id. at 141. 
43 Id. at 140. 
44 Stephenson v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union Local 100, 811 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 
(2006) (explaining that under both federal law and New York State law, the standard of re-
covery for employment discrimination consists of the following three-step framework: 1) 
The plaintiff must initially demonstrate its prima facie case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence; 2) “The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case” 
by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination; and 3) 
The burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant’s reasons for the termination are pretextual). 
45 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 140. 
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based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by defi-
nition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race.”46  
The court in Chiara did not acknowledge the lack of reference to re-
ligion-based associational discrimination claims in the two federal 
cases.47  Thus, it did not bridge the gap to show that a person who is 
discriminated against based on his marriage to someone of another 
religion is discriminated against because of his own religion.48 
Federal and state courts have not considered claims for asso-
ciational discrimination based on sex, national origin, or religion as 
frequently as those based on race.49  Additionally, federal courts have 
disagreed as to the proper standard for the right to intimate associa-
tion, and it is thus unclear under which circumstances the right to in-
timate association applies.50  The court in Chiara did not address this 
lack of precedent or obscure history and instead made its decision on 
an assumption that the logic behind race-based and religion-based as-
sociational claims are interchangeable.51  Therefore, it is crucial to 
first understand the history of Title VII associational discrimination 
and the constitutional right to intimate association in order to fully 
appreciate the implications of the Chiara case in New York and na-
tionwide. 
A. Case Law Regarding Race-Based Associational 
Discrimination 
Title VII provides, in relevant part, that it is “unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”52  The statute plainly prohibits dis-
crimination based upon an individual’s own protected class status, 
but it does not explicitly address whether an individual’s association 
or relationship with a protected third party may give rise to a discrim-
 
46 Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. 
47 See Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d 132. 
48 Id. 
49 Johnson II & Miranda, supra note 29. 
50 See Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., 485 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1988); see also Adkins v. 
Bd. Of Educ., 982 F.2d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1993); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
617-18 (1984). 
51 See Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d 132. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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ination claim.53  For many years, federal courts, based on a strict con-
struction of Title VII, did not allow associational discrimination as a 
cognizable claim.54  For example, an Alabama federal district court in 
Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.55 held that a white individual was unable 
to bring a racial discrimination claim under Title VII based upon his 
association with black employees because he was not a “ ‘person ag-
grieved’ within the contemplation of the Act” and thus lacked stand-
ing.56  A Georgia district court in Adams v. Governor’s Committee on 
Postsecondary Education,57 citing to Ripp, came to a similar conclu-
sion, holding that “[n]either the language of the statute nor its legisla-
tive history supports a cause of action for discrimination against a 
person because of his relationship to persons of another race.”58 
In 1986, the Eleventh Circuit in Parr took a broader approach 
to Title VII.59  In that case, the plaintiff, a white male, was inter-
viewed for a position as an insurance salesman at Woodmen of the 
World Life Insurance, but was not hired after the manager discovered 
“that he was married to a black woman.”60  The Eleventh Circuit held 
that a liberal construction of Title VII to include claims for race-
based associational discrimination would further the laudable goals of 
equal opportunity and protection in the workplace.61  To support its 
determination, the court looked to the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission (“EEOC”), an agency charged with the enforcement 
of Title VII and other federal laws that prohibit workplace discrimi-
nation, whose decisions have consistently allowed claims for race-
based associational discrimination.62  The Parr court also cited to the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co.,63 which 
stated that Title VII provides a clear mandate that racial discrimina-
tion will not be tolerated in any form or under any circumstances, in 
light of the nation’s history of deeply entrenched racial tensions.64 
 
53 Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, 173 F.3d 988, 993 (6th Cir. 1999). 
54 See Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (N.D. Ala. 1973); see also 
Adams v. Governor’s Comm. On Postsecondary Educ., No. C80-624A, 1981 WL 27101, at 
*3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981). 
55 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973). 
56 Id. at 208-09. 
57 Adams, 1981 WL 27101, at *3. 
58 Id. (citing Ripp, 366 F. Supp. at 205). 
59 Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. 
60 Id. at 889. 
61 Id. at 892. 
62 Id. 
63 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). 
64 Id. at 891. 
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Parr was one of the first decisions in a series of federal circuit 
court cases that liberally construed Title VII to allow associational 
race-based discrimination.65  A little over ten years later, the Sixth 
Circuit in Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac66 upheld the plaintiff’s as-
sociational discrimination claim based on his association with his bi-
racial daughter.67  The plaintiff, a white male, was an automobile 
dealership finance manager who had received praise from his boss 
and coworkers for his excellent job performance—until his biracial 
daughter visited him at work.68  After this visit, the plaintiff’s boss 
began to ridicule and berate him.69  The plaintiff had even overheard 
his boss’s statements over the telephone that the plaintiff’s mixed 
race child was “going to hurt his [boss’s] image in the community 
and his dealership.”70  The plaintiff was later discharged after he ex-
changed heated words with his boss.71  The Sixth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff had a racial employment discrimination claim based on his 
association with his biracial daughter because “[a] white employee 
who is discharged because his child is biracial is discriminated 
against on the basis of his race, even though the root animus for the 
discrimination is a prejudice against the biracial child.”72  Though the 
court acknowledged that it is unclear whether Title VII applies to 
both direct and associational discrimination,73 it nonetheless upheld 
the associational discrimination claim based on the statute’s purpose 
of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.74 
In 2008, the Second Circuit in Holcomb similarly permitted a 
claim of race-based associational discrimination.75  The plaintiff, a 
white male, was the Iona College men’s basketball team assistant 
coach, who experienced discrimination based on his marriage to an 
African American woman.76  In that regard, the college’s director of 
athletics changed a policy concerning alumni special events and pre-
game and post-game parties by prohibiting high school players and 
 
65 See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; see also Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 131-32. 
66 173 F.3d 988 (6th Cir. 1999). 
67 Id. at 994. 
68 Id. at 990. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Tetro, 175 F.3d at 990-91. 
72 Id. at 994 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 994-95. 
74 Id. at 995. 
75 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 132. 
76 Id. 
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others who were neither donors nor alumni, like the plaintiff’s wife, 
from attending future events.77  Since the plaintiff’s wife was black, 
and the high school players who attended these events were also pre-
dominantly black, the plaintiff suspected that the director’s motive 
was to appeal to white alumni for donations to the school by limiting 
the number of African Americans in attendance.78  Additionally, the 
plaintiff repeatedly overheard one of the college vice presidents mak-
ing racist comments about African Americans.79  On one particular 
occasion, after this college vice president received an invitation to the 
plaintiff’s wedding, he asked the plaintiff, “[Y]ou’re really going to 
marry that Aunt Jemima? You really are a nigger lover.”80  The Sec-
ond Circuit held that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class 
for the purposes of the discrimination suit because, “where an em-
ployee is subjected to adverse action because an employer disap-
proves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination 
because of the employee’s own race.”81  In other words, if the plain-
tiff and his wife had both been black, the plaintiff would not have 
suffered discrimination based on an interracial relationship.82  It was 
the fact that his skin color was different from his wife’s skin color 
that caused the discrimination in this case.83  The court noted that 
many district courts in the Second Circuit have agreed with this broad 
view of protected classes under Title VII.84 
B. Why Non-Race-Based Associational Discrimination 
Claims Have Not Been Similarly Permitted 
Federal and state courts have not considered associational dis-
crimination claims based on sex, national origin, religion, or other 
protected classes as frequently as those based on race.85  This may be 
due, in part, to the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as this Act 
was enacted primarily to combat the rampant racial discrimination 
 
77 Id. at 133-34. 
78 Id. at 133-34, 142-43. 
79 Id. at 133-34. 
80 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 134. 
81 Id. at 139. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Johnson II & Miranda, supra note 29. 
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that occurred across the country for centuries.86  Additionally, the low 
number of lawsuits per year for associational discrimination based on 
sex, national origin, religion, or other protected classes suggests that 
courts simply do not receive these types of cases and therefore, they 
do not have the opportunity to consider these issues as frequently as 
race-based associational discrimination issues.87 
1. The History of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The first possible explanation for the lack of precedential 
support to extend non-race-based associational discrimination claims 
under Title VII is that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the very act that 
contains Title VII, was created primarily in response to race discrim-
ination and helped to further the social movements of desegregation, 
workplace opportunity, and voting equality for African Americans 
across the country.88  President John F. Kennedy, in his nationwide 
address regarding civil rights on June 11, 1963, called upon Congress 
to enact legislation to eliminate discrimination against African Amer-
icans, declaring that “in too many communities, in too many parts of 
the country, wrongs are inflicted on Negro citizens and there are no 
remedies at law.89  Unless the Congress acts, their only remedy is in 
the streets.”90  Not one mention of religious discrimination was made 
in his speech, and this is understandable, considering that the back-
drop of his speech was the desegregation of the University of Ala-
bama, where Kennedy had deployed National Guard troops to protect 
two African American students as they enrolled at the school.91  A lit-
tle more than a year later, upon signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked: 
We believe that all men are entitled to the blessings of 
liberty.  Yet millions are being deprived of those 
blessings—not because of their own failures, but be-
 
86 Civil Rights Act, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/civil-rights-act 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
87 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited June 21, 
2016). 
88 HISTORY, supra note 86. 
89 President John F. Kennedy, Address on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) (transcript availa-
ble at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3375). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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cause of the color of their skin.  The reasons are deep-
ly imbedded in history and tradition and the nature of 
man.  We can understand—without rancor or hatred—
how this all happened.92 
The Act was primarily motivated by racial—not religious—tensions 
during the tumultuous 1960s, and the force behind Kennedy’s and 
Johnson’s words was the immediate need for anti-discrimination leg-
islation. 
2. Statistical Data for Non-Race-Based 
Discrimination Cases 
The second possible explanation for the lack of precedential 
support to extend non-race-based associational discrimination claims 
under Title VII is that courts simply have not yet considered many of 
these types of cases.  Indeed, claims filed based on religion, color, or 
national origin are not as common as claims based on race.93  The 
EEOC determined that for fiscal year 2015, 34.7% of all employment 
discrimination charges were based on racial discrimination, compared 
to a mere 3.9% for religious discrimination, 3.2% for color, and 
10.6% for national origin.94  If there are fewer cases that address reli-
gion, color, or national origin discrimination in general, then there are 
fewer chances that associational discrimination based on religion, 
color, or national origin will come before the court.95 
C. Reasons to Extend Associational Discrimination 
Law 
Though claims for associational discrimination on bases other 
than race have not been frequently considered, courts should extend 
associational claims to these other protected classes.  First, Title VII 
should be liberally construed to include associational claims in order 
to uphold its purpose to protect employees from many types of dis-
crimination in the workplace.96  Second, although it is currently “an 
unsettled legal question whether” associational discrimination claims 
 
92 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill (July 2, 
1964), (transcript available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3525) 
93 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 87. 
94 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 87 
   95   See discussion of sex-based associational discrimination infra Part V.C.2. 
96 Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891. 
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based on sex should be actionable, such a consideration at the federal 
level may open the door to consideration and approval of other types 
of associational discrimination claims as well, such as those based on 
religion.97  Third, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) ex-
plicitly prohibits associational discrimination based on disabilities,98 
and its broad allowance of such actions should be used as a guide in 
associational actions brought under Title VII.  Fourth, the logic used 
in race-based associational discrimination cases, which have held that 
a plaintiff in a biracial relationship is discriminated against based on 
his own race,99 can be applied with equal force to religion-based as-
sociational discrimination cases.  Finally, the EEOC has interpreted 
Title VII to encompass all types of associational discrimination 
claims, including those based on religion,100 and its interpretation 
should be given “great deference” in federal courts.101 
1. Title VII Liberal Construction 
Regardless of the low numbers of non-race-based association-
al discrimination claims, courts should liberally construe Title VII 
claims in order to further the purpose of the statute, which is to com-
bat discrimination in the workplace.102  In fact, the Fifth Circuit in 
Culpepper held that “[i]t is . . . the duty of the courts to make sure 
that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a 
combination of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with 
semantics.”103  This justification for race-based associational claims 
applies to other non-race associational discrimination claims as well.  
Indeed, numerous courts have considered sex-based associational 
discrimination claims and have made comparisons to race-based 
claims, though no court, to date, has explicitly permitted sex-based 
associational claims.104 
 
97 Gallo v. W.B. Mason Co., No. CIV.A. 10-10618-RWZ, 2010 WL 4721064, at *1 (D. 
Mass. Nov. 15, 2010). 
98 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2012). 
99 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. 
100 EEOC Compliance Manual, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
101 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). 
102 Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891. 
103 Id. 
104 See generally Stezzi v. Aramark Sports, LLC, No. CIV.A. 07-5121, 2009 WL 2356866 
(E.D. Pa. July 30, 2009); see also Gallo, 2010 WL 4721064. 
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2. Sex-Based Associational Discrimination 
Claims 
Currently, it is unsettled whether courts should liberally con-
strue Title VII to extend associational discrimination to sex-based 
claims.105  The EEOC was once inclined to permit such an extension 
in an employment discrimination ruling.106  In Cooke v. Nicholson,107 
the plaintiff worked with a woman in the plumbing shop at the Veter-
an Affairs Medical Center.108  His coworkers repeatedly harassed him 
for his association with the woman, as she was the only woman on 
the entire plumbing staff.109  The case was ultimately remanded for a 
reconsideration of the facts, but the EEOC first clarified that “[i]f the 
alleged harassment incidents occurred and were based on the com-
plainant’s association with [a woman] because of her gender and 
happened as frequently as the complainant claims, a fact finder could 
reasonably find unlawful sexual harassment against the complain-
ant.”110  This statement implies an EEOC endorsement of associa-
tional discrimination based on sex and offers hope that an associa-
tional discrimination claim on a basis other than race may indeed be 
cognizable under Title VII. 
3. ADA Associational Discrimination Claims 
Associational discrimination is expressly prohibited under Ti-
tle I of the ADA.111  The ADA is a federal law that forbids discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities in areas such as “employ-
ment, transportation, public accommodation, communications, and 
governmental activities.”112  Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Title I of the ADA has a provision that expressly protects 
employees from associational discrimination, thus providing a clear 
and unequivocal mandate that there is no tolerance for any “adverse 
actions based on unfounded stereotypes and assumptions about indi-
 
105 Gallo, 2010 WL 4721064, at *1. 
106 Cooke v. Nicholson, EEOC DOC 05A60305 (E.E.O.C.), 2006 WL 842209, at *4 (Mar. 
23, 2006). 
107 Id. at *1. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at *4-5. 
111 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2012). 
112 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/disability/ada.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
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viduals who associate with people who have disabilities.”113  In this 
regard, the EEOC has clarified that ADA associational discrimination 
claims are allowed even when the employee’s association or relation-
ship with the disabled individual is not familial.114  For example, the 
EEOC, on its “Questions and Answers” webpage regarding disability 
associational discrimination, explained that a claim may be allowed if 
an employee is terminated based on his contact with HIV-infected in-
dividuals at a homeless shelter where the employee volunteers in his 
spare time.115  Claims may also be allowed in situations where em-
ployers do not want to pay “increased health insurance costs” associ-
ated with disabled dependents and where employers deny opportuni-
ties for advancement within the company due to an employee’s 
“association with a person with a disability.”116  Title I offers a broad 
take on associational discrimination, which can and should be applied 
to Title VII claims based on religion. 
4. Bridging the Gap between Race-Based 
Discrimination and Religion-Based 
Discrimination 
Generally, the reasoning used in race-based associational dis-
crimination cases—that a plaintiff in a biracial relationship is dis-
criminated against on the basis of his own race—can also be applied 
to religion-based associational cases, in that a plaintiff in an interfaith 
marriage may be discriminated against on the basis of his own reli-
gion.  Even without such a comparison, Jews have historically been 
viewed as having their own ethnicity or race,117 so it is arguable that 
Chiara could have made a race-based associational claim based on 
the fact his wife, as a Jewish person, is of a different ethnicity or race.  
Either way, these arguments bridge the gap between race-based and 
religion-based associational discrimination claims, thereby suggest-
ing that courts should be more willing to consider and uphold reli-
gion-based associational discrimination claims on the ground that 
they are akin to race-based associational discrimination claims. 
 
113 Questions and Answers About the Association Provision of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
 http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/association_ada.html#_ftnref1 (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987). 
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The logic applied in race-based associational discrimination 
cases applies to religion-based associational claims.  The courts in 
Parr, Tetro, and Holcomb all held that discrimination against an indi-
vidual based on his interracial relationship was, in fact, discrimina-
tion against that individual’s own race.118  In other words, an individ-
ual in an interracial relationship is discriminated against because his 
own race does not match the race of his spouse.  By the same logic, 
discrimination against an individual based on his marriage to a Jew-
ish person is discrimination against that individual’s own religion.  
Although it is common today for Jews in the United States to marry 
outside their faith,119 there still remains some opposition to this in-
termarriage in the United States.120  Indeed, most individuals do mar-
ry within their religion,121 just as most individuals marry within their 
race.122  Therefore, a strong analogy can be made between the inter-
faith relationships between Jews and non-Jews and the interracial re-
lationships of black and white individuals, as it is likely that someone 
could discriminate against an individual for his or her association 
with someone of another faith in the same way that someone can dis-
criminate against an individual for his or her association with some-
one of another race. 
Additionally, Jews have been historically classified as a sepa-
rate race or ethnic group, not just as persons of a specific religion.123  
In fact, courts have found that discrimination against Jewish persons 
can rise to the level of racial discrimination, not just religious dis-
crimination, for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981124 and 
1982,125 both of which provide for equal rights under the law and are 
 
118 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. 
119 Chapter 2: Intermarriage and Other Demographics, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 1, 
2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/chapter-2-intermarriage-and-other-
demographics/. 
120 Intermarriage, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Intermarriage (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
121 Caryle Murphy, Interfaith marriage is common in U.S., particularly among the recent-
ly wed, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jun. 2, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/06/02/interfaith-marriage/. 
122 Mary Mederios Kent, Most Americans Marry Within Their Race, POPULATION 
REFERENCE BUREAU (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2010/usintermarriage.aspx. 
123 Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18. 
124 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
125 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
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analytically similar to Title VII retaliation claims.126  In Saint Francis 
College v. Al-Khazraji,127 a university professor was discriminated 
against on the basis of his Arabian ancestry.128  Though Arabs are 
considered Caucasian “under current racial classifications,”129 the 
U.S. Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that the professor had a 
racial discrimination claim based on his Arabian ancestry.130  Specifi-
cally, the Court held: 
Congress intended to protect from discrimination iden-
tifiable classes of persons who are subjected to inten-
tional discrimination solely because of their ancestry 
or ethnic characteristics.  Such discrimination is racial 
discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to for-
bid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in 
terms of modern scientific theory.131 
Like Arabs, Jews are not generally considered a separate race today, 
but their history as a separate race still gives rise to racial discrimina-
tion claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981132 and 1982.133  Even so, 
stigma against the marital mixing of Jews and non-Jews for racial or 
ethnic reasons nevertheless exists in parts of the world, especially 
among the Orthodox Jewish population, some of whom view inter-
marriage and the declining numbers of those who identify as Jewish 
as a “Silent Holocaust.”134  As such, the fact that some Orthodox 
Jews believe that intermarriage may diminish or destroy Jewish roots, 
traditions, values, culture, and historical perspective suggests that 
some still do identify as a separate race or ethnicity, despite popular 
opinion to the contrary.135 
Consequently, the logic used in Parr, Tetro, and Holcomb, 
 
126 Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18; see also Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). 
127 Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 604. 
128 Id. at 606. 
129 Id. at 607. 
130 Id. at 613. 
131 Id. 
132 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
133 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
134 Antony Lerman, Assimilation is Not a Dirty Word, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/sep/11/jewish-muslim-identity-
assimilation. 
135 Nissan Dovid Dubov, What is Wrong with Intermarriage?, CHABAD, 
http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/108396/jewish/Intermarriage.htm (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2016). 
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which all held that discrimination against an individual’s interracial 
marriage is discrimination against that individual’s own race,136 ap-
plies with equal force on religious as well as racial grounds to rela-
tionships between Jews and non-Jews.  If an employee is discriminat-
ed against on the basis of his interfaith marriage, it can be argued that 
the employee’s supervisor and/or coworkers do not like the mixing of 
the two faiths and are therefore discriminating against the employee’s 
own religion as it is associated with the spouse’s religion.  This is the 
same logic that has been consistently applied in many race-based as-
sociational cases.137  If Jews are considered a separate race or ethnici-
ty, an employee may be able to bring a race-based associational dis-
crimination if his or her spouse is Jewish and there is evidence that 
the employee’s supervisor and/or coworkers are discriminating 
against the employee on the ground that they view the employee and 
his spouse as having different races or ethnicities. Regardless, even 
absent the characterization of Jews as a separate race, associational 
discrimination claims based on religion should still be cognizable un-
der Title VII in any event. 
5. The EEOC 
Finally, though Title VII contains no explicit provision recog-
nizing a claim for religious discrimination based upon the religion of 
a spouse, nor is there any case law in New York on the matter besides 
Chiara, the EEOC has shed some light on associational discrimina-
tion under Title VII.138  According to the EEOC Compliance Manual, 
“Title VII prohibits discrimination against an individual because s/he 
is associated with another person of a particular religion.139  For ex-
ample, it would be unlawful to discriminate against a Christian be-
cause s/he is married to a Muslim.”140  The manual also recognizes 
associational claims based upon race, color, and national origin.141  
Since the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the EEOC’s administra-
tive guidance is entitled to “great deference,”142 courts should take 
the EEOC’s interpretation into account as they begin to consider 
 
136 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. 
137 Id. 
138 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100. 
139 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100. 
140 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100. 
141 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100. 
142 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34. 
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more non-race-based associational discrimination claims. 
D. Associational Discrimination in Chiara 
The court in Chiara relied primarily upon Parr and Holcomb, 
two race-based associational discrimination cases, but it is not clear 
exactly how the court transplanted the reasoning from those cases to 
the action before it.  For example, Holcomb held that when a person 
suffers discrimination on the basis of his interracial relationship or 
association, he is discriminated against on the basis of his own 
race.143  However, the court did not clarify whether Chiara suffered 
discrimination on the basis of his own religion in relation to the reli-
gion of his spouse.  On the one hand, Chiara claimed that he was 
called a “Jew lover” throughout his employment,144 which indicates 
that he was discriminated against on the basis of his own religion in 
affiliation with his spouse’s religion.  On the other hand, many of the 
offensive comments were generalized and did not directly target Chi-
ara or his association with a Jewish person at all.  For example, Chi-
ara’s supervisor, while in Chiara’s presence, referred to someone oth-
er than Chiara as “the fucking Jew.”145  The highway foreman, also 
while in Chiara’s presence, “referred to a yeshiva as a ‘Jew farm’” 
and pointed out that a passerby looked “like a Jew.”146  These are 
mere generalizations, as they do not directly implicate Chiara or his 
wife at all.  Furthermore, the court did not mention Chiara’s own re-
ligion and instead referred to him as simply “not Jewish.”147  By do-
ing so, the court did not emphasize the interfaith relationship and in-
stead focused solely on the fact that Defendants viewed Jews as 
distasteful and unpleasant people.  Consequently, it is difficult to ap-
ply the logic of race-based associational discrimination cases to this 
case when Defendants’ discriminatory comments were generalized 
and did not focus on the association of Chiara’s religion and his 
wife’s religion. 
It is true that the court’s decision in Chiara is in line with the 
contention that Title VII (and analytically similar state laws) should 
be liberally construed in order to ensure that discrimination does not 
 
143 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139. 
144 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 137. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 134. 
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take place in the workplace.  However, the court’s specific reasoning 
is unclear; even though it relied on federal cases that allowed race-
based associational discrimination claims under Title VII, the Chiara 
court failed to bridge the gap between race-based associational claims 
and religion-based associational claims. 
VI. THE RIGHT TO INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
The court in Chiara briefly noted that “discrimination against 
an individual based on his or her association with a member of a pro-
tected class also constitutes an infringement upon that individual’s 
First Amendment right to intimate association, which receives protec-
tion as a fundamental element of personal liberty.”148  The court did 
not explain the history of the right to intimate association, nor did it 
explain its reasoning for this holding in detail.149  Before considering 
why the Chiara court did not focus on the right to intimate associa-
tion, it is first crucial to understand the history of the right to intimate 
association both across the country and in the Second Circuit specifi-
cally. 
A. A Brief History of the Right to Intimate 
Association 
One of the first major decisions to hint at the right to intimate 
association was the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Griswold v. Connecticut150 in 1965.  In Griswold, the Court held that 
a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was unconsti-
tutional because it encroached upon the right to marital privacy.151  
After the Court surveyed a number of cases that upheld freedom of 
association as a right to assemble or congregate, the Court also 
acknowledged that the freedom of association was “more than the 
right to attend a meeting.”152  In its concluding remarks, the Court 
endorsed a right to privacy in intimate relationships, separate and 
apart from the right to associate with a group or organization: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
 
148 Id. at 141. 
149 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 141. 
150 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
151 Id. at 485-86. 
152 Id. at 483 (emphasis added). 
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Rights—older than our political parties, older than our 
school system.  Marriage is a coming together for bet-
ter or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to 
the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in liv-
ing, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not com-
mercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association for 
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior deci-
sions.153 
Indeed, the Court’s language in Griswold suggests a constitu-
tional right to intimate association.  However, it was not until twenty 
years later in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees154 that the U.S. Supreme Court 
expressly recognized the right to intimate association as its own con-
stitutional doctrine.155  The Supreme Court in Roberts explicitly de-
fined freedom of association as comprising two distinct prongs: (1) 
the right “to enter into and maintain certain intimate” relationships 
without undue interference from the State, and (2) the right to associ-
ate with others in order to engage in constitutionally-protected ex-
pressive activities, such as speech and assembly.156  Although the 
right to intimate association was never before explicitly recognized 
by name, the Court noted that courts across the country have long 
acknowledged that the protection of intimate relationships from un-
due state intrusion is central to the concept of individual freedom.157  
The Court further held that the freedom of association is necessary to 
safeguard the “certain kinds of personal bonds [that] have played a 
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation.”158 
Subsequent circuit court and district court decisions have not 
agreed on the constitutional source of the right to intimate associa-
tion.159  While the U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts alluded to the right 
as one rooted in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,160 the Court later suggested in another case, City of Dallas v. 
Stanglin,161 that it is a component of a generalized right of association 
 
153 Id. at 486. 
154 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
155 Id. at 617-18. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 618-19. 
158 Id. 
159 See Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1999). 
160 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19. 
161 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
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from the First Amendment.162  The Chiara decision also referred to 
freedom of intimate association as a First Amendment right.163 
It is likely that the right to intimate association has a combina-
tion of constitutional sources, depending on the issues of a particular 
case.  Additionally, even the standard for determining whether the 
right has been violated has varied among cases that have considered 
the issue.164  Some courts have held that the right to intimate associa-
tion is violated when an adverse action will terminate the intimate re-
lationship in question,165 while others have suggested that the right is 
violated only when there is “an ‘undue intrusion’ by the state.”166  
Regardless, at a minimum, the right is restricted to relationships of an 
extremely close nature that “attend the creation and sustenance of a 
family—marriage, childbirth, the raising and education of children, 
and cohabitation with one’s relatives.”167  Specifically, the Second 
Circuit in Patel v. Searles168 noted that there is “a sliding scale for de-
termining the amount of constitutional protection an association de-
serves,” which suggests that the most intimate relationships—such as 
familial relationships—will always receive more protection than less 
intimate ones, such as friendships or coworker relationships.169 
The Second Circuit has upheld a right to intimate association 
as it relates to race-based associational discrimination.170  In Matusick 
v. Erie County Water Authority,171 the plaintiff, a white male, was an 
employee of a public entity, the Erie County Water Authority 
(“ECWA”).172  In 2004, some of the plaintiff’s coworkers learned that 
he was recently engaged to a black woman.173  The plaintiff’s super-
visor repeatedly made racist comments and harassed him by throwing 
“lawn equipment [onto] his roof and duct-tap[ing] his door shut.”174  
On one occasion, the supervisor called the plaintiff a “nigger lover” 
and threatened to “kill all the fucking [niggers].”175  Other coworkers 
 
162 Id. 
163 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 141. 
164 See Adler, 185 F.3d at 43-44. 
165 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 364-65. 
166 See Adkins, 982 F.2d at 956. 
167 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted). 
168 305 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2002). 
169 Id. at 136. 
170 Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2014). 
171 757 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2014). 
172 Id. at 36. 
173 Id. at 37-38. 
174 Id. at 38. 
175 Matusick, 757 F.3d at 38. 
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had also repeatedly made racist comments to the plaintiff, even 
though the plaintiff had made it clear that he found the comments to 
be offensive.176  He was terminated after a series of disciplinary 
charges.177  Thereafter, he sued the ECWA and individual defendants, 
alleging, in part, unlawful discrimination and disparate treatment re-
garding the disciplinary charges and subsequent termination.178 
The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had a right to 
intimate association under the First Amendment, holding that “[t]he 
ECWA had no legitimate interest in interfering with” the plaintiff’s 
relationship or terminating the plaintiff based upon his interracial re-
lationship.179  However, in its holding, the court noted that the history 
of the right to intimate association was muddled, and there were no 
decisions from either the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit that 
definitively extended the right to engaged couples.180  Due to this 
ambiguity, the court concluded that since the right to intimate associ-
ation for engaged couples was not clearly established at the time of 
the discriminatory conduct, the defendants were not expected to 
know the law and were therefore immune from liability.181 
The Second Circuit in Matusick found it unnecessary to 
choose a standard of review.182  Specifically, the court stated that 
“[t]o interfere with Matusick’s constitutional right ‘on so unsupporta-
ble a basis as rac[e is] so directly subversive of’ the constitutional in-
terests at stake, . . . that it cannot, under any circumstance we can 
conceive of, be accepted.”183  The court explicitly held that there was 
no need to choose whether a right to intimate association claim 
should call for a strict, intermediate, or rational basis standard of 
scrutiny, or whether a balancing test should be performed “to weigh 
the relative interests of the plaintiff in preserving an intimate relation-
ship and the interests of the state in ‘promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees,’ ” because ECWA 
had no interest whatsoever in interfering with his relationship.184  
This part of the decision is key for the following analysis of Chiara v. 
 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 40-41. 
178 Id. at 41. 
179 Id. at 59-60 (emphasis omitted). 
180 Matusick, 757 F.3d at 61. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 59. 
183 Id. at 60 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978)). 
184 Matusick, 757 F.3d at 59 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968)). 
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Town of New Castle. 
B. The Right to Intimate Association as it Applies to 
Chiara 
The Second Department in Chiara did not discuss the right of 
intimate association in great detail.  Since the relationship between 
Chiara and his wife was an intimate one, and the Town “had no legit-
imate interest in interfering with” that relationship through its dis-
criminatory conduct, the right of intimate association clearly and un-
equivocally extended to him.185  As described in the Matusick case,186 
there is no need to choose a standard of review or conduct a balanc-
ing test in order to determine whether the right to intimate association 
has been violated when there is discrimination based on an intimate 
association with someone of another religion.  A town that discrimi-
nates against an employee simply because that employee associates 
with a Jewish person does not, in any way, promote a public interest 
that needs to be balanced against the employee’s interest in preserv-
ing the intimate relationship.  Why the court only briefly mentioned 
this argument may be due to the fact that the right to intimate associa-
tion has a fuzzy history.  Though the court had the opportunity to 
clarify this history, it did not do so. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Second Department in Chiara did not provide an ade-
quate explanation as to why non-race-based associational discrimina-
tion is actionable.  It failed to address the lack of case law on Title 
VII non-race-based associational discrimination and the race-charged 
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, instead resting its decision 
exclusively on two federal race-based associational discrimination 
cases without any discussion of why race-based and religion-based 
associational discrimination should be similarly addressed. 
Despite this lack of explanation, there are five reasons why 
associational claims should be extended to all the protected classes.  
First, courts should liberally construe Title VII claims in order to fur-
ther the purpose of combatting discrimination in the workplace.  
Though Chiara brought his claim under state law, the Second De-
 
185 See generally Matusick, 757 F.3d at 59-60 (emphasis omitted). 
186 Id. 
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partment nonetheless analyzed federal Title VII cases because there 
was a lack of authority under state law to support associational dis-
crimination.  If a state court relies on Title VII to support its decision, 
then it should liberally construe Title VII to make sure “the intent of 
Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict construction of 
the statute and a battle with semantics.”187  Since the court in Chiara 
failed to explicitly address the necessity of Title VII liberal construc-
tion, it was unclear why there was a comparison between race-based 
associational claims and religion-based associational claims.  Second, 
the EEOC in Cooke suggested an allowance of sex-based associa-
tional discrimination claims, offering an opening in the future for 
permitting all associational discrimination claims.  Third, there is 
precedent for allowing non-race-based associational discrimination 
claims under Title I of the American Disabilities Act, which express-
ly provides for the protection of employees from disability-based as-
sociational discrimination.  As such, a strong argument can be made 
that the logic of such ADA claims can and should be applied to non-
race-based Title VII claims.  Fourth, the logic applied in race-based 
associational discrimination cases, which have held that discrimina-
tion against an individual’s interracial relationship is discrimination 
against that individual’s own race, should be applied to religion-
based associational discrimination cases.  Specifically, it may be ar-
gued that discrimination against an individual’s interfaith marriage 
may, in fact, be discrimination against that individual’s religion, in 
that the individual’s religion does not match his or her partner’s reli-
gion.  Furthermore, if Chiara had brought a racial claim on the 
ground that Jews have been historically classified as a separate race 
or ethnic group, the Second Department’s exclusive analysis of two 
federal race-based associational discrimination cases would have 
been justified because it would have been unnecessary to address the 
extension of associational discrimination to other protected classes.  
Fifth and finally, the EEOC has broadly interpreted Title VII to allow 
religion-based associational discrimination, declaring that it is “un-
lawful to discriminate against a Christian because s/he is married to a 
Muslim.”188  This broad interpretation should be given great defer-
ence as courts consider more non-race-based associational discrimi-
nation cases in the future.  Despite all these reasons, the Second De-
partment cited only to race-based associational cases without 
 
187 Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891. 
188 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100. 
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explanation as to why the logic applied in those cases apply in this 
religion-based associational discrimination case.  It is unclear wheth-
er Chiara suffered discrimination on the basis of his own religion, es-
pecially since many of the discriminatory comments were generalized 
and did not focus on the association of Chiara’s religion and his 
wife’s religion. 
The Second Department only briefly touched upon the viabil-
ity of a First Amendment right to intimate association argument.  Ap-
plying the logic of the Second Circuit in Matusick, it is clear that the 
Town of New Castle violated Chiara’s right to intimate association 
because the Town of New Castle had no legitimate interest in inter-
fering with that relationship through its discriminatory conduct.  
However, the Second Department’s lack of a detailed discussion did 
not help to clarify the history of the right to intimate association and 
the disagreement over the standard of scrutiny to be applied. 
The Second Department’s decision that Chiara should be con-
sidered a member of a protected class based upon his wife’s religion 
under the New York State Human Rights Law is a commendable, 
noteworthy decision because it furthers the purpose of combating 
discrimination in the workplace.  Though courts across the country 
have not yet widely considered non-race-based associational discrim-
ination claims, it does not follow that such claims should be dis-
missed for lack of precedent because discrimination, in any form, is 
abhorrent and should not be tolerated under any circumstance.  It is 
crucial that courts develop consistent standards and rationales for 
such claims in order for anti-discrimination legislation to evolve and 
flourish for all protected classes across the country.  Though the Sec-
ond Department’s ultimate conclusion in Chiara is correct, its lack of 
explanation contributes to the difficulty for other courts in New York 
and across the country to address non-race-based associational dis-
crimination claims into the future. 
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